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A Rapid Reaction to O’Bannon: The Need 
for Analytics in Applying the Sherman Act 
to Overly Restrictive Joint Venture Schemes 
Stephen F. Ross and Wayne S. DeSarbo* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article reviews the recent and highly publicized district court 
decision holding that NCAA rules, which bar student-athletes from any 
compensation for image rights, violated the Sherman Act, and that big-
time athletic programs could lawfully agree among themselves to limit 
compensation to $5,000 annually in trust for each athlete upon leaving 
school.  This Article briefly discusses why the decision correctly found 
the current rule to be illegal, but also details why, under settled antitrust 
law, the critical question of how much compensation would significantly 
harm consumer appeal for college football and basketball is a question 
better left to marketing science experts.  This Article then explains why 
neither the flawed survey offered in evidence by the NCAA, nor the 
anecdotal testimony of NCAA officials, should have been credited.  
Rather, this Article proposes, as a superior alternative, the use of 
conjoint analysis, a well-recognized technique of marketing science 
analytics employed to answer the critical legal question that the antitrust 
doctrine asks in cases like this. 
 
 
* Respectively, Lewis H. Vovakis Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Two of the nation’s most important service industries, big time 
intercollegiate sports and higher education, have been recently shaken by 
a federal district judge’s decision that a number of NCAA rules designed 
to protect “amateurism” in big-time college sports violated federal 
antitrust laws.1  In O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association,2 Judge Claudia Wilken specifically held that the NCAA rule 
barring student-athletes from receiving any compensation for their 
university’s licensing of the athletes images, likenesses, or names (image 
rights) to commercial organizations was an unreasonable trade restraint 
unlawful under Section One of the Sherman Act.3  However, she 
concluded that NCAA member schools could lawfully agree to cap 
compensation for such licensing at $5,000 annually and hold the money 
in trust until the athlete graduated or otherwise left school.4 
O’Bannon correctly applied settled antitrust analysis to conclude 
that the current NCAA rule was unreasonable.  In so finding, Judge 
Wilken also was correct in rejecting the NCAA’s proffered consumer 
survey to justify the current rule.5  However, the conclusion that 
universities that sponsor big-time commercial football and basketball 
programs may lawfully agree among themselves to provide zero 
compensation above the full cost of attendance to student-athletes (with 
up to $5,000 per year held in trust for later distribution) simply does not 
follow from her decision.  The critical factual issue in this case is a 
question of marketing: how much compensation can be provided to big-
time college football and basketball players without jeopardizing fan 
appeal and demand for the product?  Instead of adopting sua sponte her 
own answer to that question, Judge Wilken should have directed the 
parties to employ a well-established measurement methodology, conjoint 
analysis, which sophisticated businesses often utilize to determine the 
salience and value of the attributes of a product/service that are desirable 
 
  *  The issues that are the focus of this Article and the litigation discussed herein 
relate to commercial aspects of intercollegiate sports.  With a few exceptions, the only 
sports that operate on a commercial basis are football and men’s basketball.  A university 
operating solely with commercial concerns would not operate other sports.  The courts 
have held that where the NCAA or its member schools are adopting rules that do not have 
a commercial purpose, the antitrust laws do not apply.  Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999). 
 2.   O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 
2014). 
 3.  Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1009. 
 4.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 962. 
 5.   Id. at 963.   
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to consumers, to predict the answer to the critical factual issue(s) in this 
case.6 
In this Article, we briefly review the O’Bannon decision and why it 
correctly found the current rule to be illegal.  Second, we critique the 
trial judge’s decision to permit the parties to significantly limit 
compensation to players for image rights, and detail why, under settled 
antitrust law, the critical question is one of marketing, focusing on the 
likely consumer response to increased player compensation.  Third, we 
outline a particular marketing science measurement technique and use 
insights gained from that analysis to see how to this critical answer could 
be approximated. 
II.  A QUICK REVIEW OF THE O’BANNON DECISION 
In O’Bannon, the challenged NCAA rules prohibit student-athletes 
from receiving any compensation for their image rights.7  In its opinion, 
the District Court first held that these rules constitute a “contract, 
combination or conspiracy” among the NCAA member schools.8  
Second, the District Court held that because some rules are essential for 
the NCAA to offer commercially successful products such as college 
football or basketball, any antitrust scrutiny would be under the Rule of 
Reason, the standard traditionally used by courts to evaluate the legality 
of agreements under the Sherman Act.9  Next, the Court set forth the 
standard antitrust analysis under the Rule of Reason, a three-step inquiry 
where: (1) the plaintiff must establish that the challenged restraint has an 
actual anticompetitive effect in a relevant economic market; (2) the 
defendant can argue that the restraint is reasonable because it furthers 
legitimate, procompetitive goals; and (3) the plaintiff can still prevail by 
demonstrating that the challenged scheme is overly restrictive, and that 
the defendant’s legitimate goals can be achieved by less restrictive 
 
 6.  Paul E. Green & Vithala R. Rao, Conjoint Measurement for Quantifying 
Judgmental Data, 8 J. Marketing Research 355, 355 (1971).  
 7.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at at 963.  NCAA regulations outlaw any “pay” for 
athletes because of their athletic ability.  NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2013-14 
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, CONST. art. 12.1.2 (2013).  The rules define “pay” as 
anything of value not authorized by NCAA regulations.  Id. art. 12.02.7.  In addition, the 
standard scholarship agreement that member schools all use provides that, with regard to 
image rights, “[y]ou authorize the  NCAA [or a third party acting on behalf of the NCAA 
(e.g., host institution, conference, local organizing committee)] to use your name or 
picture to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or 
programs.”  NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, FORM 08-3A ACADEMIC YEAR 2010–11: 
STUDENT-ATHLETE STATEMENT—DIVISION I (2008), available at 
http://www.liberty.edu/media/1912/compliance/newformsdec2010/currentflames/complia
nce/SA%20Statement%20Form.pdf. 
 8.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985.  
 9.  Id. 
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means.10  These three initial rulings each reflect well-established legal 
precedents.11 
Under the Rule of Reason analysis, the Court correctly held that the 
plaintiff had shown an actual anticompetitive effect in a relevant 
economic market.  The court credited persuasive testimony by leading 
sports economist Roger G. Noll, who testified that those student-athletes 
seeking to play football after high school found no reasonable substitute 
for college football programs participating in the Football Bowl 
Subdivision (FBS), and those seeking to pursue a post-secondary 
basketball career found no reasonable substitute for Division I college 
basketball.12  Judge Wilken reasoned that, absent the NCAA rule, FBS 
and Division I colleges would compete to lure recruits by offering them 
greater opportunities to be compensated for their image rights.13 
Second, the O’Bannon Court applied well-settled legal precedent in 
holding that the defendants could still prevail by showing that their 
restraint was reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate, 
procompetitive purpose.14  The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that 
such a purpose must result in lower prices, higher output, or output more 
responsive to consumer preference than would otherwise be the case 
absent the restraint.15 
 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996)).  See generally 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 
(1984).  In addition to these specific precedents, the U.S. Supreme Court declared almost 
a century ago that the ultimate test is whether a restraint promotes or suppresses 
competition.  Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).  So, in theory, a 
restraint could be demonstrably necessary to allow the defendant to achieve its legitimate, 
procompetitive goals, but still be unreasonable because the overall harm to the plaintiff 
outweighed any benefit to the defendant.  In fact, there are no reported sports cases and 
no known non-sports cases where a court has ever so held in evaluating a challenge under 
Section One. 
 12.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 966.  
 13.  Id. at 994, 997. 
 14.  Id. at 985 (citing Tanaka, 252 F.3d  at 1063). 
 15.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 107.  Sports antitrust law permits sports leagues to 
restrain one market if those restraints benefit another market.  Most expressly in Sullivan 
v. National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1110 (1st Cir. 1994) (involving a league ban 
on corporate ownership of NFL clubs), the First Circuit held that juries must be instructed 
to consider benefits to the marketing of NFL football as justifying harms in the market 
for NFL club securities.  Several sports labor cases imply that restrictions that could be 
shown to be demonstrably necessary to achieve a level of competitive balance that fans 
prefer would be lawful despite any adverse impact on players.  See, e.g., Mackey v. Nat’l 
Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976) (considering the preservation of 
competitive balance among NFL clubs as a potentially valid justification under the rule of 
reason, but finding particular NFL rule challenged in litigation to be overly restrictive); 
McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 F. Supp 871, 893(D. Minn. 1992) (specific jury 
findings to same effect).  Sullivan’s holding on this point applies to sports the principle 
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In applying this black letter law, the O’Bannon Court had 
previously, and correctly, reasoned that business justifications must 
concern improving output in relevant markets, not achieving other 
worthy social goals.16  Thus, a pre-trial order explicitly held that 
restraining trade in compensating football and basketball players could 
not be justified by benefits to non-revenue sport participants or female 
athletes.17  When the court addressed the NCAA’s claim that the 
challenged rule was necessary to preserve amateurism, the Court 
 
that the Supreme Court established in Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 
U.S. 36, 57-58 (1977), holding that positive effects on competition among sellers of rival 
brands could potentially justify anticompetitive effects on competition among sellers of 
the same brand.  But see Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-89 (D.C. Cir. 
1978) (suggesting that competitive balance or other positive effects in the production of 
NFL football cannot justify labor market restraints). 
   A full discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this Article.  There are a variety of 
good reasons, however, for focusing attention exclusively on the three-part test described 
in the text, thus permitting the NCAA to justify image rights restraints if they could show 
that the restraints were necessary in order to increase the output (tickets, TV ratings, etc.) 
for college sports.  First, were the NCAA not permitted to restrain trade to promote 
output, the reduced output might well result in lower compensation.  (To take an extreme 
example, if ratings precipitously dropped were star athletes to receive million-dollar 
contracts, revenues would also drop and these athletes might receive less in an 
unrestrained market.)  Second, the “apples and oranges” balancing that would be required 
to determine whether a consumer-enhancing agreement unduly harmed others would be 
close to unworkable for judges and juries to apply. 
   Perhaps reflecting unstated concerns about workability, there are two categorical 
instances where defendants engaged in a “buyer’s cartel” are not allowed to justify 
limiting competition for inputs (in this case, player services), because of benefits in the 
output market (in this case, big-time college sports).  Firms are not allowed to artificially 
hold down the cost of inputs under the theory that a portion of the savings will be passed 
on to consumers in the form of lower prices.  Nor are cartels allowed to artificially 
support more output than the market wants by allowing inefficient firms to stay in 
business, where the only justification for the agreement would be to force down player 
costs to allow colleges that could not afford to operate to do so.  In the latter case, the 
more prosperous defendants are free to share some of their revenue if they want to allow 
others to remain in the competition.   
 16.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-1967 
CW, 2014 WL 1410451, at *15, *16 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014) (citing Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990)).  Repeatedly 
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, this principle was perhaps best articulated by William 
Howard Taft, later President and Chief Justice, when serving as a court of appeals judge.  
In a landmark antitrust opinion, then-Judge Taft observed that some judges had 
incorrectly “set sail on a sea of doubt” when they sought to determine for themselves 
when competition was or was not in the public interest.  See United States v. Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as modified, 175 U.S. 211 
(1899).  American antitrust policy reflects the view that Congress, rather than individual 
unelected federal judges, should make that policy choice.  See Matthew J. Mitten & 
Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the Educational Values and 
Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 U. Or. L. Rev. 837 (2014), for an 
argument that worthy social choices indeed should justify replacing pure marketplace 
policies with broader social concerns.  
 17.  In re NCAA, 2014 WL 1410451, at *16. 
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correctly focused on whether the restraints were “necessary to maintain 
the popularity of FBS football and Division I basketball.” 18 
In meeting its burden as part of the second-step of the Rule of 
Reason analysis, a defendant must “come forward with evidence of the 
restraint’s procompetitive effects.”19  This means more than some 
plausible theoretical connection between the challenged restriction and 
some legitimate goal.  In this context, the critical question is whether a 
particular rule or restraint contributes in a significant way to the 
popularity of college sports.  In this regard, the court correctly rejected 
the NCAA’s evidence: a highly flawed survey of 2,455 respondents 
concerning consumer attitudes toward college sports.20  The key 
conclusion of this flawed study was that those surveyed “generally 
opposed the idea of paying college football and basketball players.”21  
While a properly designed public opinion survey22 of general social 
attitudes might be quite relevant to the policy question of whether 
Congress should enact an exemption to give effect to public opposition 
to paying student-athletes, general social attitudes are completely 
irrelevant to the antitrust analysis properly outlined by the Court.  
Antitrust analysis requires the court to focus on metrics related to output.  
When writing about making output more responsive to consumer 
 
 18. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000.  The O’Bannon Court considered and rejected 
three other plausible procompetitive justifications.  Id. at 999-1005.  Like the 
justifications discussed in text, the court held that the challenged rules could be justified 
to the extent necessary to maintain a level of competitive balance that fans prefer.  Id. at 
1001.  However, the court found no evidence that image rights restrictions achieved that 
goal.  Id. at 1002.  The court also accepted as legitimate the NCAA’s justification that 
rules were necessary to improve the “quality of educational services provided to student-
athletes in the restrained college education market.”  Id. at 1003.  However, unless 
compensation was so large that student-athletes were cut off from the broader campus 
community, the court found that the restraints in this case—as opposed to tutoring, 
support services, and academic progress rules—did not serve that goal.  Id.  Finally, the 
court expressly considered the NCAA’s justification that limiting compensation for 
image rights affected the ability to generate greater output in relevant markets. Id. at 
1004.  However, the court found that the claim that “the current rules enable some 
schools to participate in Division I that otherwise could not afford to do so is unsupported 
by the record.”  Id.  The court noted that neither the NCAA, nor its conferences require 
high-revenue schools to subsidize teams at lower-revenue schools (the standard technique 
in American professional sports leagues).  Id. 
 19.  Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hairston 
v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 20.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 976. 
 21.  Id. at 975. 
 22.  In fact, the court implied that this particular survey had another irremediable 
flaw:  An initial question about what respondents had heard regarding paying players 
focused many respondents’ attention on the payment of illegal, under-the-table payments 
to players, which is wholly irrelevant to the issues in the case.  Id. at 976. 
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preference,23 the U.S. Supreme Court meant this in reference to the 
preferences revealed by consumers in the marketplace, not in their living 
room.  In this regard, the O’Bannon Court correctly noted that the results 
of the survey, in which sixty-nine percent of those surveyed were 
opposed to paying student-athletes, was “not relevant to the specific 
issues raised here” because the key was “how consumers would actually 
behave if the NCAA’s restrictions on student-athlete compensation were 
lifted.”24 
The court found “most relevant” the survey questions addressing 
whether respondents would be more or less likely to watch, listen to, or 
attend college football and basketball games if student-athletes were 
paid.25  However, the questions were not relevant to the issues in this 
case, because these questions asked about consumer behavior if athletes 
were paid either $50,000 or $20,000 per year (a specific attribute).26  
This simplistic approach presents a number of problems.  One, the 
survey did not inquire about consumer attitudes about lesser sums, or 
with regard to image rights.  Two, output there was multidimensional 
and involved revenue sources such as attendance of games, watching on 
television, listening on other media sources, purchase of merchandise, 
etc.  The potential effects of paying college athletes needed to be isolated 
for each source, because one cannot assume that any changes in the 
“product of college football” or the “product of college basketball” affect 
all consumers equally.  Three, the potential ramifications to the consumer 
of paying college athletes can also be multidimensional, concerning a 
multitude of attributes specific to these particular outputs. A single 
attribute may be involved in such a proposed program.  For example, 
should high sums of money be considered for payment to athletes, if 
consumers might suffer some inconvenience and additional costs?  Such 
factors should be jointly considered in such surveys.  Here, many 
consumers are unable to accurately determine the relative importance 
that they place on product attributes when asked to do so in an outright 
manner.27  Furthermore, individual attributes are perceived differently in 
isolation as compared to when those same attributes are aggregated and 
 
 23.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85, 98 (1984).  
 24.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 975. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 976. 
 27.  John R. Hauser & Vithala R. Rao, Conjoint Analysis, Related Modeling, and 
Applications, in MARKETING RESEARCH AND MODELING: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 141, 
141–68 (Yoram (Jerry) Wind & Paul E. Green eds., 2004). 
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examined in the actual combinations found in the relevant product(s) or 
service(s).28 
III. CRITIQUE OF THE O’BANNON CONCLUSION 
In O’Bannon, Judge Wilken expressly articulated the second of the 
three-step Rule of Reason test as requiring that a defendant “come 
forward with evidence of the restraint’s procompetitive effects.”29  
Indeed, with regard to several of the NCAA’s defenses, Judge Wilken 
applied the second step analysis in reasoning that the Court need not 
“address the availability of less restrictive alternatives for achieving a 
purported procompetitive goal ‘when the defendant fails to meet its own 
obligation under the rule of reason burden-shifting procedure.’”30  Thus, 
“the Court does not consider whether Plaintiffs’ proposed less restrictive 
alternatives would promote competitive balance or increase output 
because the NCAA failed to meet its burden with respect to these stated 
procompetitive justifications.”31 
In light of the court’s factual findings that the NCAA had 
introduced no evidence supporting its claim that restricting image rights 
compensation had a positive impact on output, the district judge should 
have ended the inquiry and enjoined further enforcement of the law.  
Instead, Judge Wilken chose to focus on anecdotal testimony that was 
not really challenged by the Plaintiffs that “preventing schools from 
paying FBS football and Division I basketball players large sums of 
money while they are enrolled in school may serve to increase consumer 
demand for its product” and that likewise, paying star players huge sums 
might inhibit efforts to integrate student-athletes into the campus 
academic community, thus harming the quality of the educational 
“product.”32 
It is difficult to square the Court’s very different treatment of the 
competitive balance and amateurism justifications.  Both justifications 
are theoretically plausible: if players were able to take advantage of a 
completely unrestrained market for sale of their image rights, it is 
possible that this would exacerbate the already imbalanced competition 
 
 28.  Vithala R. Rao, Developments in Conjoint Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF 
MARKETING DECISION MODELS 23, 23-55, (Berend Wierenga ed., 2008). 
 29.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985. 
 30.  Id. (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 
1913b (3d ed. 2006)).  Judge Wilken also cited Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 n.16 
(10th Cir. 1998) ("Because we hold that the NCAA did not establish evidence of 
sufficient procompetitive benefits, we need not address question of whether the plaintiffs 
were able to show that comparable procompetitive benefits could be achieved through 
viable, less anticompetitive means."). 
 31.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1005. 
 32.  Id. at 1004. 
  
2015 A RAPID REACTION TO O’BANNON 51 
for college football and basketball, thus reducing consumer appeal, just 
as huge image rights payments might harm consumer demand for the 
product.  The problem is that in both contexts, the NCAA failed to 
produce any evidence that the challenged restrictions on image rights 
had any effect on their procompetitive goals.33 
Having puzzlingly credited the NCAA with meeting its burden of 
showing that the challenged image rights restraint promoted some 
procompetitive goal, Judge Wilken then invented a remedy of a $5,000 
annual cash payment to be held in trust.34  Judge Wilken’s own antitrust 
analysis does not support that decision. 
To illustrate, suppose that the O’Bannon suit had never been 
brought.  Suppose further that the newly autonomous NCAA division 
featuring the “Power Five”35 football conferences had adopted the 
 
 33.  A remarkable argument about the appropriate burden shifting under the Rule of 
Reason has been made in an amicus brief filed by a number of noted antitrust scholars 
and a leading antitrust practitioner in support of the NCAA’s appeal in O’Bannon.  Citing 
well-established precedent that business agreements need not be “the least restrictive 
alternative” but only that the challenged restriction must be “fairly necessary” to justify 
the challenged restriction, see Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 
1248–50 (3d Cir. 1975), these experts argue that once the NCAA showed that some 
restrictions on player compensation would yield procompetitive benefits, then the burden 
shifted to O’Bannon to prove that a specific alternative would achieve the identical 
benefits.  Brief for Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, O’Bannon 
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. 2014), at 10–12.  
This claim, if accepted, would radically diminish antitrust scrutiny of overly restrictive 
agreements among collaborations with market power.  Such a burden is very difficult to 
meet, and to allow NCAA member schools to agree among themselves to limit image 
rights compensation to zero, because of anecdotal evidence that compensation in excess 
of $50,000 annually might harm output, gives a sports monopsony unwarranted 
unreviewable economic power.  It is also inconsistent with other sports precedents.  In the 
two litigated professional football labor cases, the NFL’s overly restrictive agreements 
were held unreasonable, despite each court’s recognition that some labor restraints would 
be procompetitive, without any proof of a specific alternative that would achieve all of 
the NFL’s legitimate goals.   See e.g., Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 
621 (8th Cir. 1976) (considering the preservation of competitive balance among NFL 
clubs as a potentially valid justification under the rule of reason, but finding particular 
NFL rule challenged in litigation to be overly restrictive); McNeil v. Nat’l Football 
League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 893 (D. Minn. 1992) (specific jury findings to same effect).   
Likewise, in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 
667, 675 (7th Cir. 1992), Judge Easterbrook upheld an injunction against a challenged 
NBA restriction on television rights sales, finding that the league’s legitimate interests 
could be served by the less restrictive alternative of revenue sharing, without identifying 
the specific formula that the NBA could adopt that would accomplish all of its legitimate 
goals. 
 34.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008. 
 35.  The “Power Five” are those conferences with the greatest football revenue:  The 
Southeastern, Pacific 12, Big Ten, Atlantic Coast, and Big 12 conferences.  See Brian 
Bennett, NCAA Board Votes to Allow Autonomy (Aug. 8, 2014, 1:22 PM ET), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11321551/ncaa-board-votes-allow-
autonomy-five-power-conferences. 
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following rule: all member schools agree that they will insist that football 
players grant the school all rights to their names, images, and likenesses, 
but in return, these players will be paid $5,000 per year, with the money 
to be held in trust until they graduate or otherwise leave school.  Finally, 
suppose that this new rule had been the subject of an antitrust lawsuit by 
five-star Alabama Crimson Tide freshman Cam Robinson. 
Assuming the defendants did not proffer new evidence that the 
NCAA had failed to offer in O’Bannon, and that the district court in the 
hypothetical case of Robinson v. Southeastern Conference et al., 
described above, followed the legal analysis used in O’Bannon, the trial 
judge would conclude that this rule is an unreasonable restraint of trade 
in violation of section one of the Sherman Act.  The court would find 
that the rule is fairly characterized as a “contract” between the members 
of the Power Five conferences.  Next, the court would apply the Rule of 
Reason, because some rules are essential in order for big-time college 
football to exist.  The court would then apply the three-step Rule of 
Reason burden-shifting approach.  First, the court would identify the 
quality of play, the likelihood of success in the NFL, exposure, money 
spent on coaching and facilities, along with other factors, and would 
almost certainly find that there are no reasonable substitutes for Power 
Five conference football.  Second, the court would examine the 
justifications for this rule.  As in O’Bannon, the court would not allow a 
justification based on the need to cross-subsidize non-revenue sports.  
Given the lack of general revenue sharing and the evidence in the record 
(including historic competitive imbalance in college football), the court 
would likely find that the restriction was not necessary to promote 
competitive balance.  As in O’Bannon, the critical issue would be a 
marketing question: whether the restraint was necessary to increase 
output of college football.  Absent new evidence, the court would find no 
evidence in the record that the restraint furthered that goal. 
In a somewhat puzzling outcome, a United States District judge 
issued an order imposing a remedy that, if it had been voluntarily agreed 
to by many of the defendants, would constitute an antitrust violation.  
However, trial courts rely on the adversarial system, and the trust 
concept was one proposed by the Plaintiffs’ counsel.  Perhaps, as a 
matter of trial strategy, this was a sensible proposal to offer the judge a 
chance to pick a “safe” alternative that clearly would not impair output.36  
However, there is a more precise and effective way to determine with 
greater precision the amount of restricted compensation necessary to 
 
 36.  Since the Plaintiffs won, it requires temerity to second-guess winning trial 
lawyers. 
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ensure that the popularity of big-time college sports among consumers 
remains undiminished. 
IV.  CONJOINT ANALYSIS AND ITS UTILITY IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
Conjoint analysis is a measurement methodology most appropriate 
to answer the legal question posed by O’Bannon: to what extent can 
limits on compensating players be justified by the need to maintain 
consumer demand for college football and basketball?  This 
methodology has been utilized in a variety of different disciplines 
including marketing, political science, healthcare, economics, recreation, 
energy, transportation, food safety, organizational behavior, law, 
engineering, etc.37  Conjoint analysis is a set of market research 
techniques that measures the value or utility a specific market places on 
each feature or attribute of a designated brand of product/service and 
predicts the value of any combination of features.38  Conjoint analysis 
asks questions that force survey respondents—actual or potential 
consumers—to make trade-offs among features, determines the value 
placed on each feature based on the trade-offs made by respondents, and 
permits simulations as to how the market will react to the various feature 
trade-offs being considered.39 
Conjoint analysis assumes that the consumer demand for a 
particular good or service is a function of the utility of the product’s 
underlying features or attributes.  Typically, the list of relevant attributes 
is determined a priori through in-depth personal interviews, focus 
groups, or past surveys.  As an illustration, the important attributes of 
demand for attendance of college football games would likely include the 
brand or conference (i.e., loyalty to a particular university because of 
geographic proximity or attendance by the fan or a family member), 
ticket price, time of game, location, quality of the game (on-field strength 
of home and visiting teams), weather, in-stadium amenities (for live 
attendance), whether the participating athletes are full-time students, and 
whether the participating athletes are receiving compensation for their 
services, etc.40  Although the attributes tested in conjoint analysis must 
 
 37.  VITHALA R. RAO, APPLIED CONJOINT ANALYSIS 31–33 (2014). 
 38.  Id. at 163. 
 39.  Paul E. Green & Yoram Wind, New Way to Measure Consumers’ Judgments, 53 
HARV. BUS. REV. 107, 108–109 (1975). 
 40.  Previous literature has studied all the variables other than the last two, and 
recognized that these variables significantly impact attendance and television ratings.  See 
generally Tim D. DeSchriver & Paul E. Jensen, Determinants of Spectator Attendance at 
NCAA Division II Football Contests, 16 J. SPORTS MGMT. 311 (2002).  Prior studies, 
however, simply show the degree to which changes in these variables affect attendance.  
See Alex Koenig, What Factors Contribute to Attendance in College Football?, HARV. 
SPORTS ANALYSIS COLLECTIVE (Jan. 17, 2011), 
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be features one can categorize, the attributes do not necessarily have to  
be numeric.  Conjoint analysis provides insights into the value of various 
brands as well as insights into the value of product features, including 
price sensitivity. 
 Once marketing analysts have identified the principal attributes 
driving consumer demand, they can develop a marketing survey. There 
are many types of conjoint analyses, but one of the most popular forms 
today is choice-based conjoint analysis (CBC).41  CBC’s major 
advantage is that the task of choosing a designed product/service is 
similar to what buyers actually do in the marketplace.  Choosing a 
preferred product/service from a group of products/services is a simple 
and natural task that every respondent can understand.  In addition, the 
profiles formed are combinations of the levels of the designated 
attributes that may or may not describe actual scenarios.  As an 
illustration, consider our college football illustration described earlier.  
Suppose one were interested in modeling the choice decisions and utility 
functions for fans of a particular university’s college football team in 
hopes of assessing the potential effects of paying the players.  Assume 
that the relevant set of attributes tested (and their levels) were determined 
from prior focus groups to be: Opponent (Notre Dame, University of 
Southern California, Alabama, Conference Game), Ticket Price ($100, 
$150, $200), Weather (Clear, Rainy, Snowing), Parking Fee (Free, $10, 
$25), Athlete Payment (None, $5000, $10,000, $25,000), Venue (Home, 
Away), Media (On Radio, On Local TV, On National TV), Kickoff Time 
(Noon, 4PM, 8PM), Halftime Entertainment (None, Band, Celebrity 
Singer) and In Game Promotions (None, Ethnic Foods, Giveaway).42  In 
this effort, a CBC respondent might see the following choice set: 
 
Which of the following football game would you most likely attend? 
Select “None” if you would not attend any of these listed games. 
 
Opponent =Notre 
Dame 
 Opponent =USC Opponent 
=Alabama 
$100 $150 $200 
Rainy Clear Snowing 
 
https://harvardsportsanalysis.wordpress.com/2011/01/17/what-factors-contribute-to-
attendance-in-college-football/. 
 41.  Jordan J. Louviere & George Woodworth, Design and Analysis of Simulated 
Consumer Choice or Allocation Experiments: An Approach Based on Aggregate Data, 20 
J. MKTG. RES. 350, 350-367, (1983). 
 42.  Note that this illustration is purely hypothetical and not based on any actual 
consumer responses. 
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$25 Parking Free Parking $10 parking 
Athletes Not Paid Athletes Paid $5000 Athletes Paid 
$25000 
Away Game Home Game Away Game 
On National TV On Radio On Local TV 
Noon Start 4 PM Start 8PM Start 
Halftime Band 
Show 
No Halftime 
Entertainment 
 Celebrity Singer 
Ethnic Food 
Specials 
Giveaway Merchandise No Special 
Promotions 
 
From responses to such questions derived from a user specified 
experimental design, conjoint analysis uncovers the underlying utility for 
each level of each attribute.  Options for estimating main effects and 
selected interactions are possible (e.g., interactions between Paying the 
Athlete and Price) and such options can be built in the specific 
experimental design utilized.43  Multinomial Logit and Hierarchical 
Bayesian analyses44 are utilized to estimate such utility functions at the 
aggregate, market segment, and/or individual level.45  From such 
statistical analyses, the user obtains quantitative estimates as to the 
impact of each level of each attribute, as well as significance tests to 
indicate the significance of the estimate obtained.46 
For example, suppose the utility values for the levels of the Paying 
Athlete attribute were47: 
 
Paying Athlete Effect   t-value 
No Payment 1.113  13.361 
$5000 -0.016 -0.732 
$25,000 -0.367 -5.122 
$50,000 -0.491 -5.463 
 
 43.  DAMARAJU RAGHAVARAO, JAMES B. WILEY & PALLAVI CHITTURI, CHOICE-
BASED CONJOINT ANALYSIS: MODELS AND DESIGNS 117–44 (2010). 
 44.  RAO, supra note 37, at 117.  
 45.  Wayne S. Desarbo, Michel Wedel, Marco Vriens & Venkatram Ramaswamy, 
Latent Class Metric Conjoint Analysis, 3 MARKETING LETTERS 273, 273-288, (1992). 
 46.  SAWTOOTH SOFTWARE, INC., SAWTOOTH SOFTWARE TECHNICAL PAPER SERIES: 
THE CBC SYSTEM FOR CHOICE-BASED CONJOINT ANALYSIS 22-23,(version 8, 2013). 
 47.  Where the column for Effect designates the increase or decrease in the latent 
utility function produced by the corresponding level of this attribute, and the t-value 
designates how significant the estimate is (i.e., is it significantly different from no effect 
or zero).  
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This hypothetical illustrates how, given the levels tested (which is 
an important caveat), the Paying Athlete attribute levels display an 
interesting and informative structure.  Here, the most preferred option is 
for no payments to athletes, which carries a positive increment to overall 
utility.  All other options involving payments carry a negative effect on 
utility and choice probability.  Note, there is more to be learned for this 
market.  Evidently, paying the athlete $5000 does not significantly 
detract from preference or choice probability (i.e., output).  However, the 
jump to $25,000 or $50,000 seriously affects preference and choice 
probabilities in a negative manner.  Note, these values can be calculated 
for each attribute/level and individual as well as for the overall market 
and by derived or specified market segment.  Each of the level values is 
called a part-worth because they represent the worth of any given part of 
the product (football game). 
Once estimates of the part-worths for each level of each attribute are 
obtained, one can begin to understand what trade-offs fans make so a 
product (game) will be more desirable to the market.  This predictive 
capability is where the real power of conjoint analysis is evident.  For 
example, given a set of estimated part-worths, one might have the 
following choice scenario describing the three football games described 
earlier: 
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Game  A  Game  B  Game C 
Opponent =Notre 
Dame 
Opponent =USC Opponent 
=Alabama 
$100 $150 $200 
Rainy Clear Snowing 
$25 Parking Free Parking $10 parking 
Athletes Not Paid Athletes Paid $5000 Athletes Paid 
$25000 
Away Game Home Game Away Game 
On National TV On Radio On Local TV 
Noon Start 4 PM Start 8PM Start 
Halftime Band 
Show 
No Halftime 
Entertainment 
 Celebrity Singer 
Ethnic Food 
Specials 
Giveaway Merchandise No Special 
Promotions 
 
Total Utility 0.462 -0.311 -1.156 
Exp(Total)   1.588   0.7330.315 
Choice Prob. 60.2%   27.8% 11.9% 
 
Here, Total Utility is the calculated value of each of the three 
profiles according to the specific design of the particular profiles and the 
estimated model coefficients. One then derives the probability of 
selection or choice by taking the exponential of these total utility values, 
and then calculating the ratio of Exp(Total) to their sum. Thus, in a three-
way contest between Games A, B, and C, about 60% of the market 
should choose Game A, 28% should choose Game B, and 12% should 
choose Game C.  One can also factor in a “No Choice” Option (Not 
Attend Any of These Games) in these calculations as well.  The overall 
value of a product is referred to as its total utility. 
By associating each attribute level with a part-worth, the analyst can 
create any number of competitive scenarios by mixing and matching the 
levels and increasing or decreasing the number of products.  The desired 
result of most conjoint analysis studies is the creation of a logical 
framework to build a mathematical model that allows a simulation of, for 
example, the share of the market that will prefer one product or 
another.48  In addition, one can isolate the direct effects of altering the 
 
 48.  Green & Rao, supra note 6, at 355–63. 
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levels of the Paying Athlete attribute within the profiles tested and obtain 
a quantitative estimate of the market effect. 
These choice shares, totaling 100%, are called “shares of 
preference,” because they refer to the share of the market that prefers 
each game option, if everything else were equal.  Choice shares are not 
market shares per se, as they don’t take into account a variety of other 
factors, such as sales and marketing efforts, distribution channels, brand 
loyalty, etc.  Simulating shares of preference here is a powerful tool.  
One can run simulations to help determine a response to a competitor’s 
change in its product.  Firms contemplating additional new products can 
also use this technique to predict whether that will be beneficial, and 
from which products in the existing market a new product will grab the 
most share. 
As applied to the antitrust inquiry in O’Bannon, conjoint analysis 
allows the analyst to determine with some precision a number of 
important questions.  First, conjoint analysis can determine, assuming the 
other attributes were unchanged, the level of compensation to athletes 
that would negatively affect demand.  Second, to the extent that 
compensating athletes may lead to higher ticket prices demanded by 
major programs, conjoint analysis can determine how those changes will 
likewise affect demand.  In addition, one can employ optimization 
techniques to obtain optimal levels of each attribute that would maximize 
share or profit.49 
Because this analytical marketing tool allows endless scenarios to 
be tested in a competitive landscape, share of preference allows for 
powerful “what if” analyses.  Given the mandate from Board of Regents, 
focusing on comparing changes in price and output to what “they would 
otherwise be,”50 this tool is well suited for resolving difficult antitrust 
questions posed under the Rule of Reason. 
One of the obstacles courts face when reviewing antitrust challenges 
to long-standing agreements among competitors is the difficulty of 
determining with any confidence what “would otherwise be”—in the 
words of a foreign competition law tribunal, what is the 
“counterfactual.”51  Where a similar league behaves differently, the 
 
 49.  Paul E. Green, J. Douglas Carroll & Stephen M. Goldberg, A General Approach 
to Product Design Optimization via Conjoint Analysis, 45 J. MARKETING 17, 17-37, 
(1981). 
 50.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85, 98 (1984). 
 51.  See, e.g., Rugby Union Players' Ass’n  Inc. v Commerce Comm’n (No. 2), 
[1997] 3 NZLR 301 (HC) (assessing the challenged restraint against a counterfactual 
which is “the Commission's pragmatic and commercial assessment of what is likely to 
occur in the absence of the proposed arrangement"). 
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results can be easily compared.52  Conjoint analysis has provided 
powerful insights in business even when a product is so new it has no 
competition and will create its own market.53  In addition to market 
simulations and shares of preference, conjoint analysis also analyzes the 
likelihood that a “new product” will be purchased by consumers.  
Purchase likelihood (i.e., probability) is often appropriate for specific 
product design as well.  In the O’Bannon litigation, for example, the 
analysis could estimate the impact on consumer demand of various re-
configurations of college football, including modest payments to athletes, 
allowing athletes to market their own image rights, or permitting 
complete professionalization of the market.  Purchase likelihood analysis 
uses the total utility of a product to determine a percentage indicating the 
relative likelihood that the product will be purchased, given various 
combinations of features and pricing. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The structured Rule of Reason analysis that courts use in analyzing 
agreements among competitors, where some agreement is necessary to 
develop and promote the product, properly allows defendants to justify 
rules or regulations with some anticompetitive impact by showing that 
they are reasonably necessary to maintain or promote the consumer 
appeal of their product.  In most markets, consumer demand is based on 
the appeal of various attributes of the product.  An effective way for 
courts to answer the antitrust question of whether a particular restraint 
advances or maintains consumer appeal is to use conjoin analysis, a 
widely used marketing technique that allows the analyst to determine 
with some precision how strongly consumers value particular attributes. 
As applied to the recent antitrust suit by college football and 
basketball players, challenging the NCAA’s blanket prohibition on their 
compensation for the use of their image rights, the analysis would begin 
by recognizing that consumers place a very high value on college 
football and basketball.  As the U.S. Supreme Court observed in the 
context of college football, it is a distinctive product that makes it far 
more popular than professional sports to which it might otherwise be 
 
 52.  See, e.g., Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 115 (rejecting claim that college football 
television restraints were necessary to promote competitive balance in light of 
competitive balance maintained in college basketball without these restraints); Chi. Prof’l 
Sports Ltd. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting 
argument that challenged restraint necessary to avoid “free riding” by individual NBA 
clubs because of revenue sharing alternative used by Major League Baseball). 
 53.  Dick R. Wittink & Philippe Cattin, Commercial Use of Conjoint Analysis: An 
Update, 53 J. MARKETING 91, 91-96 (1989).  
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compared, such as minor league baseball.54  If Justice Stevens were an 
expert in marketing rather than antitrust law, he might say that the 
quality of on-field play is one attribute of consumer demand (shared by 
the Big Ten and baseball’s minor Pacific Coast League for example), but 
the identification with the academic tradition in college sports is another 
attribute that has a significant effect on demand.  The relevant antitrust 
issue then becomes whether the challenged compensation ban on image 
rights is reasonably necessary to maintain the high demand for college 
football and basketball. 
Conjoint analysis is a widely used technique in marketing science 
that permits a reliable estimate on how changes in a product’s attributes 
will affect consumer demand.  It would allow an expert witness to test, 
verify, and/or reject Justice Stevens’ casual observation that this 
differentiation is explained by the fact that athletes must attend class and 
must not be paid.  Done correctly, it can provide highly persuasive 
evidence of the precise legal question the Sherman Act poses about 
whether an agreement that lessens competition can be justified by 
enhancing the product’s consumer appeal. 
 
 
 54.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102. 
